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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-INFANTS-JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION OF A
TEENAGE OFFENDER-The defendant, a male age seventeen, was con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder committed
when he was fifteen years old. He had been held, since the day
following the incident, under juvenile custody for "theft from a
person," specifically, stealing thirty dollars and the victim's auto-
mobile, until he reached the statutory age of seventeen. The Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas, with one dissent,' held the age of
the offender at the time of prosecution would determine whether
or not to try as a juvenile or an adult. Foster v State, 400 S.W.2d
552 (Texas 1966).
The holding of the instant case represents the majority of juris-
dictions which employ the defendant's age at the time of prosecu-
tion criterion rather than when the offense was committed.2 The
minority view is found in nine American jurisdictions and Canada,
which hold the defendant's age at the time of the offense to be
the determining factor 3
Analysis of the rationale of these theories requires an under-
standing of the statutes pertinent to the juvenile offender. Juvenile
Court and Delinquency Acts are common to all states, following
Illinois which instituted the initial juvenile delinquency act in 1899.1
1. Morrison, J., believed there had been a denial of due process in that the defendant
had been convicted on the same evidence and transaction that had resulted in committing
him and holding him as a juvenile offender until he reached statutory age for trial as an
adult.
2. Davis v. State, 259 Ala. 212, 66 So.2d 714 (1953) But see Bell v. State, 20 Ala.
App. 101, 101 So. 68 (1924), State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960) , Lee
v. State, 214 Miss. 740, 59 So.2d 338 (1952), State ex rel. Heth v. Moloney, 126 Ohio St.
-526, 186 N.E. 362 (1933), Wilson v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 10, 82 P.2d 308 (1938), Hultin
v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 425, 351 S.W.2d. 248 (1961) Dearing v. State. 151 Tex. Crim. 6,
204 S.W.2d. 983 (1947) , State v. Ring, 54 Wash. 2d. 250, 339 P.2d. 461 (1959).
3. United States v. Fotto, 103 F Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), United States v. Jones,
141 F Supp. 641 (E.D. Va. 1956), State v. Dubray, 121 Kan. 886, 250 Pac. 316 (1926),
Childers v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.2d. 255 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951), State ex rel. Clayton v.
Jones, 192 La. 671, 188 So. 737 (1939) Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 156
N.E.2d. 649 (1959), State ex rel. Bresnahan v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist.,
127 Mont. 609, 263 P.2d. 968 (1953), Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 442, 114 A.2d. 1, Cert.
denied 350 U.S. 942 (1955) But see Ex parte Williams, 117 N.J. Eq. 517, 177 AUt. 85
(1935), State v. Coble, 181 N.C. 554, 107 S.E. 132, (1921), State v. Musner, 110 Utah
543, 175 P.2d. 624, (1964), vacated on other grounds, 333 U.S. 95 (1948), EX parte
Cardarelli, 2 West Week 223, (Brit. Col. 1929), 1 D.L.R., 575 (1930).
4. Family Court Act. Ill. Laws 1899 § 1-26.
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It is the intention of such acts to rehabilitate the errant youth in-
stead of merely punishing him. Hence, the policy is one of reform
and restoration of the "whole youth." 5 Specifically, juvenile delin-
quency legislation is based on the belief that the youthful offender
needs rehabilitation. The juvenile delinquent, as such, is not charged
with a criminal offense, but instead, is subjected to a procedure
conducted by the state which will evaluate his behavior to determine
if he has deviated from the norms of society If the juvenile author-
ities determine that the youth has so wandered, their duty is to
decide what programs are necessary to protect, guide and educate
him so that he will mature and become productive for himself and
society
The functions of the juvenile court as an institution have been
variously described: (1) to remove the child offenders from the
ordinary criminal courts to the equity courts, which consider the
doer rather than the deed; and (2) to have this juvenile court render
protection and treatment to other children needing both.6 The
idealism of the legislation's purpose is truly commendable, but it
has entered into criminal law's function of moral education and
certain authorities caution that change is needed.
7
The Texas Juvenile Delinquency Act, has been declared to be
inherently a civil statute.8 This act, by virtue of its civil nature,
will have a great effect on the severity of the sentence if the of-
fender is adjudged guilty The question has arisen in Texas con-
cerning the denial of due process.9 Decisions have held no such
infringement of individual rights as the accused was not denied a
speedy trial' 0 because there was no undue delay.1' The defendant
was declared to be a juvenile delinquent since at the tine of the
murder he also "removed property from a person," and thereby
,was placed in the state's juvenile custody until he reached age
5. See e.g. FEDERAL YoUTH CORRECTIONs ACT, 18 U.S.C. 5005-5024, TEx. Rzv. Civl
STATS. ANN. § ct 2338-1 § 1 (1964).
6. VEDDER, JUVENILE OFFENDERS 146 (1963).
7. See e.g. Ludwig, Conniderations Basic to Reform of Juvenile Offender Laws 29
ST. JOHNS L. Rav. 226 (1955). "Making treatment of all criminal behavior of young
offenders, regardless of its seriousness or triviality, depend solely upon the individual need
of the offender for rehabilitation may well level our impressionable young community to
conclude that fracturing someone's skull is no more immoral than fraturing his bedroom
window."
8. Hultin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim 425, 351 S.W.2d. 248 (1961) "The Juvenile
Delinquency Act is, in its entirity, a civil statute aid proceedings thereunder including
commitment provided are civil and not criminal in nature." See also Lazaros v. State,
228 S.W.2d. 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
9. Perry v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 282, 350 S.W.2d. 21 (1961) (In the Perry case, the
district attorney waited purposely until defendant, a juvenile delinquent, reached age 17
before presenting the matter).
10. TEX. STATS. ANN. art 1 § 10 (1955).
11. E.g. Elliott v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 140, 324 S.W.2d. 218 (1959), Wood v. State,
171 Tex Crim. 307, 349 S.W.2d. 605 (1961).
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seventeen.12 It is true that abuse of justice might result but, ac-
cordingly, the court in Hultmn v State declared:
[The Juvenile Delinquency Act] does not give the juvenile
a vested right to be tried immediately following the commis-
sion of the offense. It merely provides that if he or she is
proceeded against before reaching the age of seventeen or
eighteen respectively, such proceedings shall be in Juvenile
Court.'1
Any connotation that the juvenile offender was punished for a
specific crime has been expressly rejected, rather, his confinement
was due to delinquent behavior per se.' 4
The decisions indicate that the juvenile delinquency acts have
not provided immunity from prosecution until reaching majority for
a crime which would be a felony ', The fact that a youthful law
breaker has been judged a juvenile delinquent has not barred further
punishment.' 6 Double jeopardy has been precluded by the rationale
that a juvenile court does not acquire jurisdiction over the felony. 7
In the instant case, the juvenile court maintained its jurisdictional
integrity, although the presiding judge was also the judge of the
district court.18
The Minnesota case of State v Dehler'9 resulted in a decision
worthy of notice in holding that a district court could try a thirty-
four year old defendant for one of several murders committed at
age sixteen. The salient facts needed to understand the logic of the
decision are: due to procedural error the defendant did not appear
before a juvenile court as required by law; 20 defendant petitioned
12. TEX. REV. CiviL STATS. ANN. art 2338-1 § 3 (Supp. 1966). "The term delinquent
child means any female person over the age of ten (10) years and under the age of
eighteen (18) years and any male person over the age of ten (10) years and under the
age of seventeen (17) (a) who violates any penal law of this state of the grade of
felony."
13. Bupra note 8. (Furthermore, the court held that the power to prevent such
occurances is a legislative and not Judicial function).
14. Dearing v. State. 151 Tex. Crim. 6. 204 S.W.2d. 983 (1947) "[W]hile the appellant
is confirmed and punished by reason of his delinquency, he is not being confined for the
crime of burglary. True it is because he had committed an offense denounced as penal, that
such wag the reason of his delinquency having been determined and his confinement is
caused by the fact of his being a delinquent child, and although in his absence of such
burglarious acts, his delinquency could not be established, nevertheless his confinement
and therefore punishment, is for being a delinquent child and not for being a convicted
burglar."
15. Roberts v. State, 153 Tex. Crim., 308, 219 S.W.2d. 10,16 (1949) [citing Arrendell
v. State, 60 Tex. Cr1m. 350, 131 S.W 1096 (1910)] A clear statement of public policy
is indicated in that. trying the defendant as a juvenile would find him committed to the
state school only until he reached twenty-one. "Yet, he has long since passed such a mile
post in age."
16. E.g. Roberts v. State, supra, note 15, Dearing v. State, supra note 14.
1?. E.g. Martinez v. State, 171 Tex. Crt. 443, 350 S.W.2d. 929 (1961).
18. TEx. REv. CiviL STATS. ANN. art. 2338-1 § 4 (1964).
19. 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d. 696 (1960,).
20. MINN. STAT. ANN. 260.22 (1959).
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for a writ of habeas corpus and was discharged for lack of juris-
diction of the district court due to the earlier failure to comply
with the Juvenile Court Act. 2 1 Following immediate re-arrest and
conviction, the court held
that where an offense was committed before accused reach-
ed eighteen, but his arraignment before a judge was not
held until after he became eighteen, it was not necessary to
transfer the case to juvenile court, but that offense could
be tried by criminal court without reference to juvenile
court proceeding.'
The crux of Minnesota's holding seems to be that the earlier trial
and imprisonment were void, the defendant being discharged sub-
ject to right of the state to retry him for the offense with which he
was charged, since upon his discharge he no longer had the status
of a juvenile.
23
Holding contrary to the age criterion discussed above, are those
courts which state that the age of the offender at the time of the
offense determines the jurisdiction which will prosecute.2 4 The
theory in these jurisdictions differs from the common law principle,
which treated child offenders over the age of seven as adult crim-
inals, only in extending the age limit by statute. They indicate that
the purpose of the juvenile legislation is to reform the offender
while he is still a juvenile. Moreover, the commission of an of-
fense, misdemeanor or felony, does not automatically become a
crime because of a time lapse.25 Under this view, a delay in ob-
taining jurisdiction over the offender until after he has reached the
statutory age, has not prevented the juvenile court from obtaining
jurisdiction over him.
26
New Jersey has demonstrated clearly the operation of the "age
at the time of the offense theory ,,27 By statute,2s if the defendant
was a child when the illegal act was committed he could not be
charged or tried specifically with that crime, but must be held for
"juvenile delinquency "129
The doctrine of Parens Patria has been invoked in juvenile
21. Ibid.
22. State v. Dehler, supra note 19.
23. See State ex rel Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 90 N.W.2d 219 (1958).
24. E.g. United States v. Fotto, 103 F Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) United States v.
Jones, 141 F Supp. 641 (E.D. Va. 1956) , Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 442, 114 A.2d. 1, Cert.
dented 350 U.S. 942 (1955).
25. See e.g. State v. Dubray, 121 Kan. 886, 250 Pac. 316 (1926).
26. Id. at 319.
27. Johnson v. State, supra note 24, State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d. 21 (1954).
28. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2 A. 4-14 (SUPP. 1966).
29. Johnson v. State, supra note 24.
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delinquency actions as the duty of the state to protect the public
interest from people who are dangerous to the public if not under
custody 3 The end result, one can readily see, is much the same
as that held m those jurisdictions such as Texas, yet the means
differ considerably
There is a notable modification to the results obtained in New
Jersey, Minnesota, Texas and similar jurisdictions which is illustra-
ted by the federal government's treatment of delinquents. Offenses
involving non-capital or life imprisonment penalties are covered by
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.31 The provisions include a
three year statute of limitations from the date of the violation of
law This eliminates any extreme result which might occur if the
violator remained at large for an extended period of years.
A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, Kent v
United States,3 2 has manifested the difficulty centering around the
latitude given the juvenile court to determine whether it should re-
tain or waive jurisdiction. The issue arose because the hearing
given the offender was not deemed to meet the requirement of full
investigation. The statute required a judgment based on inquiry not
only into facts of the alleged offense, but also into the applicability
of the Parens Patria doctrine.33 The substance of this decision is
found to be the nature of the hearing, particularly the extent to which
it is conducted. The hearing in Kent fell short of the statutory
requisites because the decision to prosecute was rendered merely on
a superficial hearing by the District of Columbia juvenile authorities.
The impact of the decision in Kent upon the treatment of juvenile
offenders in North Dakota has not yet been determined. Chapter
27-16 of the North Dakota Century Code contains the applicable sta-
tutory provisions regarding juvenile delinquency Evidently North
Dakota employs the theory of the age at the time of the offense
to determine which court will assume jurisdiction." To date there
have been no successful challenges to the provisions of the code.3 5
The provision is a sound one in that it emphasizes rehabilitating
the youth rather than punishing him.
30. Johnson v. State, supra note 24. Application for a writ of habeas corpus dismissed.
Defendant age twenty-five, sought release from murder committed at age fourteen.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 5031-37 (1951). It Is the federal government's intention not to prejudice
the defendant by, postponing trial until the statutory age is reached See United States
v. Fotto, supra note 24.
32. 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966). Note that this decision was reached two days before
the instant case.
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
34. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 27-16-08 (2). "Concering any person under twenty-one years
of age residing winthin the county charged with having violated any city or village
ordinance or law of this state or of the United States prior to having become eighteen years
of age ;"
355
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Skeptics might criticize the statute for being too liberal, claim-
ing the offender can use the provision as a shield. This, however,
is not necessarily true. With the exception of an atrocious offense
such as murder, the average youthful offender commits a relatively
minor ifraction that would warrant only a nominal fine if com-
mitted by an adult. In all too many circumstances, a parent pays
the fine and the child learns little, if anything, from the experience
in court. On the other hand, if the same child must face the juvenile
authorities, the Juvenile Commissioner, in the presence of the par-
ents, has the necessary power 36 to make the meaning of respon-
sibility better known to the child, the one needing it the most.
Idealistically a law should provide for all possible circumstances,
but reality shows that none do. Both methods discussed for treat-
ing youthful offenders have merit, but the one employing the age
at the time of the offense is preferable. Specifically, the approach
provides a greater guarantee of justice by devaluating a delay in
proceedings until the accused reaches the statutory age at which he
can be tried as an adult criminal. If the alleged offense is so grave
that juvenile law would be inappropriate, a hearing to determine
whether or not to waive the authority of the juvenile court, can be
resorted to. In the main, such an action will not be required. It
is unrealistic to wait until a youth reaches a certain age and then
bring charges against him as an adult for an offense which was
committed as a juvenile.
JOHN C. GOLDEN
AUTOMOBILES-WHAT LAW GOVERNS-AN ABROGATION OF LEX
Loci DELECTI IN CONFLICT OF LAws-While the plaintiff and
defendant were on a temporary pleasure trip to South Dakota
they were involved in an automobile accident which resulted in
plaintiff sustaining serious and permanent injuries, incurred when
the defendant negligently drove his vehicle off the road. At the time
of the accident both young men were residents of the state of Minne-
sota. A motion by the defendant to obtain a summary judgment based
apparently on the doctrine of lex loci delect,' had been denied and
on appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court, affirming the dismissal,
35. See State v. Jackman, 93 N.W.2d. 425 (N.D. 1958).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-02 (1960).
1. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 384 (1934) "(1) If a cause of action in tort
is created at the place of the wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of the wrong, no recovery in tort can be
had in any other state."
